tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 6, 2014 4:00am-6:01am EDT
to better paying jobs. the war on pover tiff accomplished neither of the two things. these two issue goals. first, we have the single of upward gine mobility in human history in our disposal. the american free enterprise system. host: as we continue to take your calls on class in america. the reason to do it. robert in new york. an e-mail last week, talking about the need to have a economic on inequality and class issues in the united states. robert, i hope you're watching. for three hours here. we're doing your views, john, raymond, washington, you're on air.
john, what do you do for a living? caller: had a heart attack. disabled. host: income and where does it come? caller: on social security. nonstarter.is a i own my own home. the only thing is with my health bad, it hen it goes so doesn't matter how muchoff make. you don't have enough, you know, ability to actually spend it. host: so you feel that we're in a class warfare here in the u.s.? caller: i live in a small town, the small thrown is dying. populated byown is people who have lived here all of their lives. most of the jobs are of city, staflt, you know, county, and federal government jobs. those are all owned by people who have grown up here. now, we do have some factories here. those people are
immigrants that have moved into else.and everywhere they're increasing in town. and they're -- they're the only the that are working in low-paying jobs. and there's no chance of them a -- had three schools. like the the people immigrants or everything else, cast off to one school. the two towns together represents like 5,000 people. schools.three high you know? and if you lived in the big schools for igh less than 2,000 kids or 1,000 kids is unheard of. have three fully functioning high schools. host: so let's go back to our morning.is class in america? caller: yes. -- : can i get to caller: it's a caste system poor people f the are shoved off to certain lower schools. they're not allowed into the better schools.
host: thank you, sir. rick in fairfax, virginia here suburbs. not push the right line. get the right line. line.we'll get the right here is rick, fairfax, virginia; $50,000.to good morning, what do you do for a living? how old are you? your education level? caller: 50 years old, a bachelor's in business. retail in fairfax. underemployed. caller: pretty much, i'd like to start a business. host: how long have you worked fairfax?n caller: long time, ten years. host: okay, why? oh with you, ie honest study the economy. study politics a lot. i want to make a few points. congressional e budget office, overall federal taxation is on average effectively progressive.
ceo effective gle tax rates and they'll see -- they'll see -- they've done 10 reports on that over the years. econdly, the incomes -- the shares of incomes have not really changed a whole lot. you include the government also alan ion and reynolds of cato and others have looked at that. total l problem is which ent-related cost s reating $8 trillion per year, $5.5 trillion of the spending. bout $2.5 trillion of
regulations and other indirect costs. ost: you've thrown a lot of figures out here. what point are you trying to make? caller: i'm saying that the problem is the waste within the $8 trillion which is about in my estimation $2 trillion per year. than the ore accumulated wealth of the bottom 50%. we waste more in my opinion in ne year than the total accumulated assets of the bottom 50%. meaning to 've been ask this question -- what i've is s-- trying to do, set up a new kind of forum, inaking of the class problem america. i've been talking to the organizations in dc. in trying toowhere set up like an independent like blogger forum. a
what i wanted to ask you to could c-span potentially sponsor a forum. who rick, as someone watches c-span on a regular basis. you know we don't >> on the next "washington hill willpatrice look at the jobs numbers for august. the centerewis from for strategic and international studies examines the security of information stores on the cloud. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. "washington journal" live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span.
here are some highlights for this coming weekend. caters --the, mean the communicators." watch the latest debates on c-span. a debate between kay hagan and her republican opponent. and from the california governor's race, jerry brown and republican nominee. mikeht on book tv, gonzalez hell he thinks republicans can make gains with the hispanic vote. sunday at noon on "in depth, " conversation wihth mary frances berry. america," the making of the hoover dam. then the pardoning of president richard nixon.
you can email us. join the c-span conversation. like us on facebook. forum examines the israeli-palestinian conflict. supremeat, the nebraska court hears oral arguments concerning the keystone xl pip eline. then president obama's closing remarks at the end of the nato summit. a group of foreign-policy expert participated in a discussion on the israeli-palestinian conflict. representatives from both sides of the dispute discussed the political and humanitarian implications of the latest conflict in gaza. the event is hosted by middle east institute and the foundation for middle east peace. it is an hour and 20 minutes.
>> take you all for joining us this afternoon. >> after 50 days of war, israel and hamas reached a cease-fire on august 26. the office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs reports 2104 were killed including 1004 hundred 62 civilians, 495 children and 253 women. the tabulation is ongoing. the key question is what will it take to transmit the current
truce into a longer endeavor. how can we avoid getting here ?gain the center for the middle east policy at brookings and a founding board member of the american egyptian rule of law association. deviously serving as an advisor and permanent status negotiations with israel from 2004 to 2009. michael is the program director at the institute and a current participant at the atlantic council. officerforeign surface a book thatlishes
you should all read. middle east and north africa division, an expert on middle rights issues. the bimonthly middle eastern magazine report -- to set up the discussion here, first i would like to go to howard and michael to discuss some of the domestic political dynamics among palestinians and among israelis that have been driving the events of the past few weeks, the reconciliation agreement between the palestinians. go to joen and i will with comment on international humanitarian law and questions
raised by the conduct of both sides during the gaza war. take it away. >> inc. you, matt. thank you all for being here. i was asked to talk a little bit about the impact on palestinian domestic politics. on the surface it seems pretty , superficially, the main impact is that thomas has hamas hasonger -- become stronger. politically, it has been strengthened.
he was seen as marginalized in the process and seen as being ineffective. seen theou may have recent poll by the palestinian -- you never know the full name. the palestinian center for research. hamas went from being very weak. from being quite strong, even within gaza, it holds true. s's reality is that hama resistance has been more effective than the approach
focuseds been centrally on the diplomatic process. he has been ineffective not just in gaza but you have to look at it in context of the broader middle east peace process which is his bread and butter. he is all about his credibility and the legitimacy of negotiating a two state solution. it has not gone all that well. even the broader goal of national liberation. certain extent, at least momentarily, they have been able to restore some sense of palestinian pride and it is important to not underestimate the importance of these intangibles for both.
the symbolism is very important for a national liberation movement. , the newfound popularity might be fleeting, but i think it is what abbasre than has going for him. his credibility rests almost entirely on the negotiations process and bringing about a two state solution which is dependent upon the u.s.. surface, i think the picture is a little bit more complicated. hamas, the at within lines between them have been blurred over the years. if you look inside, you see internal cleavages with both camps.
i think those have been exacerbated by this conflict. you have this division between the leadership inside gaza and outside, which is classic palestinian history. the distinction between leadership in the territory, palestine -- you also have the military political split which i think was exacerbated during the war. in various moments, it wasn't clear who was calling the shots. to think ofher ways it in terms of radicals and pragmatists. the internal cleavages have been intensified by the conflict and they need to be worked out. the same is true on the other side of the political equation in palestine. plo are notoriously
dysfunctional politically. there is chronic dysfunction in these institutions. fatah itself, it has been true for a long time. more specifically to the gaza seen -- iwe have wouldn't call it isolation, but -- he is becoming a little bit more alone since he is personally committed with the negotiations process. that is dependent on the united states and others in the inner circle of the plo/pa leadership are beginning to realize that that is a dead-end. so he is sort of the last remaining holdout in terms of the american-led peace process approach.
so that is part of the equation. and fatahd, howamas have grown stronger or weaker vis-à-vis each other but both have been weakened in absolute terms, in terms of the broader palestinian political arena. it's problematic because we don't currently have viable alternatives. and we have not yet seen a credible or viable third wave or however we want to term it. we have to look at palestinian politics in terms of broader politics. the trends within very much reflect the trend in the broader arab world. specifically political dysfunction. the same sorts of contradictions that led to the arab spring or
alsowas the arab spring exist in palestinian society. crisis in the leadership and this is true across the region. there are dysfunctional or nonfunctioning political institutions in the case of the palestinians both the pa and the plo. you have this generational divide where a new generation of hasers or a new generation a very different set of demands and their elders have allowed for. all of this does not necessarily bode well. you do need political forces to
sustain ae able long-term uprising or mass mobilization of that sort. you do need a credible organizational structure on the ground. or one reason or another, the two main groups are not necessarily interested in much more narrow parochial ways that would be needed for mass mobilization. were still advising the palestinians, which i'm not, but if i were, i would say that the notrity now needs to be on negotiations or resistance, but on fixing the palestinian house and putting the palestinian house back in order. first and foremost, because i think gaza depends on it. i think it's impossible to envision any sort of reconstruction much less improvement to the situation without genuine and practical
hamas-pa conflict on the ground. we see that reflected in the cease-fire talks and in the terms of the cease-fire where it is clear now and before the war that there needs to be a return to gaza to allow the borders to be open. active artistic patient and support. essential for them to be grow.o survive, much less it is also true because in the , it depends on not just institutions,
but i wouldn't expect to see elections any time sooner. it might actually complicate things. is the actually needed palestinian national consensus. i think it is probably equally true. palestinian on politics. palestinians need to rethink their basic assumptions of their national aspirations. i will end on this note. they are important old and new palestinian constituencies that were exasperated or intensified by the gaza conflict.
thes the cradle of movement. in the west elite and the gulf and elsewhere. and also, palestinian citizens of israel. a sense of pan palestinian solidarity that i think was awakened by the gaza conflict. both of those constituencies will need to be accommodated in one form or the other. it may be in the context of israeli politics for palestinian citizens of israel. that certainly the diaspora has in the rethinking of internal palestinian politics. bearing in mind that gaza is, in many ways, a cross-section of
palestinian -- the global palestinian community in which it is made up of 60% or 70% descendents of refugees from 1948. >> michael, just to set things up a bit, the recent poll that we saw showing hamas having benefited by the war. it was overwhelming public , one was the stated goal of diminishing and not crushing them. also shown that netanyahu now finds himself in trouble with competitors to his right like
bennett and lieberman. can you address that? >> thanks for putting this panel together. i think it is useful when thinking about israeli politics in the contacts -- context of , beforermath of gaza the gaza war and where things are now. they have real challenges of the , the serious nature netanyahu personally. in many ways, it has been the invisible man. more vocal opponents are
actually in the cabinet. the view was firmly in can -- firmly in control. it did not create any political crisis for bb. first, there were low expectations across the political sector. in fact, many people did not want them. really did not present much of a challenge domestically. another factor was the sense that the situation for israel, despite many warning signs on the horizon was not quite dire and they are forced to make a move.
it was a focus on how maas -- hamas, before the war, at its weakest point. they assume this was a situation that was going to continue. much of the discussion was focused on the pa and focus on abbas, despite the fact that these talks have collapsed. then we moved during the war and there was a huge out pouring of support. any time there is fighting in .srael it still shapes the israeli psyche in ways that have changed possibly forever.
israelismajority of will not tolerate any type of rocket fire going to israel. while rockets are coming in, netanyahu really had blinding support to deal with it. the kidnapping and murder of the added toaeli teens what was already overwhelming support for a military campaign against hamas. netanyahu really use this to his advantage. he sort of had a free pass initially on the shifting goals, depending on if the goals were to eradicate hamas, restore tunnels, theyte shifted as the war went along. as the war went on, it went from
a high of about 82% down into the 30's. there was an approval rating of 3% at one point, and a drop of 50% is still not something that any israeli leader likes to see. in 2012, the israeli operation was relatively quick. crucially, the rocket fire continues. has it rejected, broken, or lapsed, they realized pretty quickly that they had no long-term strategy.
airstrikes were not going to be enough. and so, there was a sense toward the end that netanyahu had not handled things in the ideal way. is over,the war netanyahu's position is a bit less stable. politicians are pushing things much more to the right. they now have to deal with challenges, both of him his own party. if you look at the polls that have come out over the last few days, it is clear that the right in general has benefited from the fighting in gaza. have anywherels between 29 and 31 seats accrued. at the moment they controlled 31 but 11 of those seats, they are
used -- [indiscernible] they made a deal before the election. seats of their own, somewhere between 29 and 31. they currently have 12 seats and toa poll, anywhere from 18 20. they are anywhere from 9%-12% and labor has stated the same and if an election was held today, you would probably have 120where between 80 out of going to parties on the right. with in it, there's serious pressure on netanyahu and his position has never been great and the u.s., people think of
netanyahu as far right and he is certainly right when the but not on the far right. netanyahuit seems, has at the left. are far moreembers right-wing than netanyahu. many of the more right wing anders who are all younger sort of amendment 13 party they said the u.s., it netanyahu did not go far enough and advocated israel to read occupy for however long it takes to stamp out hamas. netanyahu is not willing to it realizes himself he isn't feasible but he faces his own party. the chair of the central
committee and who was the deputy minister until netanyahu fired him the first week of the war for criticizing the government's approach is convening the party congress later this month where no doubt there will be nothing but lots of vocal criticisms on the conduct of the war. outside of netanyahu's party as i mentioned is the jewish home party is much more popular now than it was. bennett is taking serious strides to capitalize on that. he announced he would like to make changes to the constitution that would make it a more secular party which is significant because he's looking to appeal to the right and for the first time i believe he actually has a shot at being the bearer of the right and perhaps even becoming pregnant mr. and so all these things are
pushing netanyahu steadily to the right and it seems like the announcement of the 980 acres that were prepared on the state land because in the absence of the occupying, netanyahu know that he has to do something and the easiest way to do that in the politic of the israeli right is to announce the long-term planning processes for settlement. in general, they don't want to risk a hamas takeover in the west bank and the aftermath of the type of the war and this type of fighting generally makes israelis more hawkish and security conscious than they would otherwise be. so the trend in my view is not going to the abyss. whatever the elections are and there is a wide speculation they will be within the next year, whatever the next elections are i have very little doubt of the parties are going to increase their share in the government.
whether that means a larger share or if they suffer at the hands of the ied there is going to be a likely more right wing. and of course, that is going to impact the relations of the palestinians going forward. and the peace process more generally. >> i am going to turn to joe to address the international humanitarian issues relating to not only the war but conduct of the war, bombardment and the use firing mortars by hamas and of the policy of the blockade. one of the key elements of the demand is worth rendering this and even the blockade was a condition of the cease-fire that was not implemented and this is going to be one of the most important items for the
discussion in the talks that i very much hope will take place in egypt. if you can take a crack at that. >> thank you, matt and kate for holding this event and inviting me to be a part of it. human rights watch obviously as the name would indicate looks at the human rights violations by state, by political authorities. but we also monitor compliance with the laws of war, the humanitarian law. one component is the geneva convention. human rights watch doesn't take positions on whether any party to any conflict should take up arms or launch an attack. those are political issues and political questions that we don't address. in part in order to be able to impartially look at how the
fighting and the armed conflict is conducted by the parties. the two issues that we are concerned with here before i go into some of the details are one is accountability that is for unlawful behavior and noncompliance with the law of the war and other serious violations and the other is the humanitarian consequences of the war in particular and the policies that set up the conflict to begin with among which i would include not just mentioning the blockade but intensively in effect since 2007 since hamas basically took over as the political power in gaza. and really, since 2005 with the withdrawal of the unilateral withdrawal of the military forces and settlers under the prime minister.
the accountability issue i want to stress because it seems to me the elements that should be part of any kind of looking forward. and it is what has been consistently missing in terms of any of the peace talks agenda as we have seen no matter how unsuccessful they may have been and it's certainly not because of the accountability that was among the issues raised. it's been a consistent issue for us looking at the various phases to confine ourselves to gaza. i think what we have seen a little dispiriting is we haven't seen much change looking from one conflict to another. 2009, 2012 at about 2014 and the behavior of the combatants, hamas's behavior into the
conduct of hostilities. let me say one thing about with the international demand that syrian law requires. the key principle is the distinction. the parties have to distinguish at all times between the combatants and civilians, but -- between military objectives into civilian properties. and they may only target combatants and structures or areas that have immediate military gain. targeting civilians is obviously sort of the first order of the prohibition. but then there are other areas in the indiscriminate attacks, so there might be an attack where there is a legitimate attack by combatants or a place or structure or building, an apartment building for instance
where maybe arms have been stored making it a legitimate target in itself but where the harm to the use of the weapons that are used, the character of the fighting and so forth results in making the attack essentially indiscriminate for the civilians, many civilians are harmed. the humanitarian law understands sort of from the get-go that civilians are going to be hurt. the point is to minimize the harm so the parties in the conflict have to take into to use the language of the conventions all feasible precautions to avoid harming civilians. on the palestinian side, hamas and recalling also that the combatants are not only hamas
but they include the forces like jihad for instant into some of the secular palestinian parties. obviously the rockets launched into israel were first of all the reason that we would say does constitute to the war crime in and a sense of targeting civilians. many groups, they said they are attacking population centers essentially and so with a state they stayed in many cases is the aim as such and the type of weapons they are using are inherently not guided and cannot be used in a way that could distinguish between military targets and civilian areas and structures. so from the get-go you have a situation where that kind of weapons the palestinians are using in fighting the attacks in
israel itself are at the very least inherently indiscriminate and then in terms of the fighting and the combat that went on once the forces moved in and even during the campaign the issue of the extent to which hamas did or did not take a all of the feasible precautions in terms of carrying out military operations in the population areas. the idea of the defense forces have documented and i will go into a little bit of detail a couple of instances where it appears the individual civilians were targeted into trying to flee the combat zone in the instruction of the idea. this is something that we also saw in the previous conflict in
2012, and especially in the 2009. the issue is whether the attacks were indiscriminate or not. so there was the idea that there were military targets in a particular building or near a particular building for instance the attacks that killed large numbers of civilians. about a number of cases that we investigated, we found there actually was no military objective. there were no combatants in the area as far as we could determine. and the israeli government
committee's response did not come up with any explanation as to why they launched those particular attacks. i wanted to say a little bit about -- first i should say that one of the problems we have had in addressing this particular conflict is a lack of access. the last time we were able to go into gaza, in other words israel if we asked for permission to go into the fall of 2009 many weeks before it started, we were refused. up to that point, the request and the delays and so forth we would eventually get in. we've not been allowed in through since 2009. in the other instances we were able to go in after the hostilities ceased after the cease-fire was in place after the crossing and sinai between gaza and egypt. but the relations with
egyptian government currently are about as good as they are in the israeli government and they have not been able to get in that way either but it makes it more difficult to do what we think is needed in terms of conducting an investigation that when you actually get to the site of a possible crime or war crime when you can't evaluate the damage and make a judgment as to whether that's what then was appropriate under the circumstances, survivors and so forth. our ability to do that is very limited. we do have research assistance on the ground and the residents of gaza but obviously the people who bring in the kind of added expertise that that we have in assessing the armed conflict situation where issues of all feasible precautions what does that mean come issues that are
disproportionate. again, those depend on not reading the newspapers and saying thousands of palestinians were killed, scores of israelis were killed, disproportionate, no. one can talk about it in a political sense disproportionate but in the legal sense as implications for accountability -- you have to look at each individual attack and make that assessment and i would invite you to look at our website and see the work that we have done. on the figures, the number of palestinians killed. the idf claims the combatants in the terrorist operatives and they said that there are 800 other cases that are not yet
determined. they are sure we will send, many of t cases were combatants. the phrase that the israelis used in the terrorist operatives is much less clear-cut at least in terms of humanitarian law. a person belonging to hamas, for instance, is not a legitimate target under the rules, under the law. the policy into gaza conflict has been to treat these people as legitimate targets so that is
one issue that we would take strong issue with the israeli understanding. a lot of attention has focused on the relatively high-profile attacks that have involved schools. both the israeli attacks and the three of which were in habitat by displaced persons, not students and that they resulted in a number of civilian deaths. we investigated those cases in which there were fatalities and the kind of responses we got as to why this particular school is targeted or why it is hit. in one case, they said in july 24, the school -- i think where 13 people were killed including six children, they said that there was one mortar shell
however the witnesses, the survivors to that attack told us that there were four shells that landed directly outside of the school's compound. the israelis said there had been a hamas operation firing anti-tank missiles near the schools but again, not indicating what constitutes mere in this case a fairly loose term. they also asserted that when the mortar hit, it is empty which isn't something that again is a variance with what people on the scene told us. there was another strike on august 3 that didn't involve an artillery and mortar but involved a guided spike missile.
it hit right outside of a school, 10 meters from the entrance and children in particular were people who were, the displaced people who were taking shelter in the school were out at the gate buying food, water, sweets, this kind of thing. the idf said there were eight people killed, some children, and they were attacking the three islamic militants who were riding by on a motorcycle. now, they are assuming that's correct they are certainly a legitimate target but particularly with the spike, it's the sort of thing that the israelis should be using in this conflict.
but why did they hit before it got there? in other words, not ready to draw the conclusions from what we know about this incident but it warrants investigations. one of the things that seems new looking at conflict seems to be more precise to attacked the residence homes and the civilian structures have been damaged, destroyed in previous conflicts as well. but it was more from the consequence of the use of artillery which has a very wide damage radius rather than the precision weapons but what we have seen is some precision attacks. for instance, this isn't one that we investigated, but the
human rights group did where there is an attack on july 29 on the four-story residential building in that killed 25 people. there was no warning as far as one could determine no explanation. they did learn that one of the residences was an operative, a political operative in the senior leadership of the palestine, one long islamist long-standing political group. two questions at least, is he by being a political operative eventually the unknown military engagements was he a legitimate target? and then the second, even if he he was a legitimate target, it seems pretty clear that attacking this residence is such devastating consequences would constitute the indiscriminate attack. let me just say a word quickly
about the humanitarian impact. i think that back in 2012 the un put out a report called the gaza 20/20 is looking at if the present trends continue and again this was 2012, these are going to be the issues in terms of housing units that are needed in health care, electricity, sanitation, these issues. and one has has to when one looks not only of human casualties but that the destruction of homes and schools and the power plant into gaza's one electric power plant if 20/20 has a telescope into 2014. we are looking at a society that has been, you know, under siege in the sense of this blockade, this rather strenuous blockade for many years now. just to return to the accountability question.
the first principle is that individual states are responsible for the conduct of the residents, certainly if they're armed forces and security forces. so in the first instance under the principle justice and global justice in this case israel or the palestinian authorities should be undertaking these kind of investigations of the conduct of their forces. up until now, both sides although israel for its part has a just system have really failed that test. given that it seems that element on the ground that they at the very least provide some sort of leverage or improved behavior in this regard in addressing these
violations of the law, frankly is a national criminal court. unlike the institution that's been set up to deal with situations with states that have a primary responsibility that are unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility. we are in a new situation politically in that since the last conflict of 2012, the palestinian authority could ratify the treaty which would make it a party to the statute and therefore eligible to present cases, allegations for the investigation by the international criminal court. that something they didn't have that capacity until a year or so ago legally speaking, diplomatically speaking.
israel, while it signed the treaty back in 1999, has ever ratified it and has indicated that it has no plans to ratify. the other way the case gets taken up by the international criminal court is if it is referred by the un security council which they've done in the case of libya. you know, politically the chances of that happening going to israel or the palestinians is absolutely nil. that is one new element to look at as we look ahead. >> i am just going to do a round of questions with the panelists here. and then after after that we will come to the audience for more questions. first to khaled, you had talked about the crisis of legitimacy in the palestinian movement and
the need to establish a consensus but you also said that elections could complicate things more. so my question is how then to create that and how to generate that consensus and what mechanisms other than election is here? >> it is a dilemma that is a dilemma that i think a lot of countries have confronted over the last several years. do you hold an election first to determine how do you decide who gets to write the rules of the game in the constitution? for for example, should you hold an election first or play to the group that is perceived as rep resentative and it is kind of a chicken and egg a sort of question. i think that with experience as
i interpret it as borne out that holding elections to decide we saw that happen in egypt where unless there is a broad consensus of the main societal and political actors upfront on the rules of the game, then the outcome of any election or political process is likely to be contrasted. we saw that both in the cases of the election and after his overthrow. in the case of the palestinians, they are based on winners and losers and then you are deciding the way forward and it means hamas and fatah have a different approach. one is committed to a two state solution and the other is not. it has a very different vision of how to resolve the conflict as well as how to govern palestinians. so, you can't make those subject
to an election because they are affected by everything including the weather, literally. if you try to hold an election in this environment, you are going to get a very distorted, skewed outcome that will not be to the advantage of those currently in power i think. on the one hand, you need the right conditions but you also need the broad agreement. the way that it has operated in the past, plo is operated on the basis of consensus. and that is the consensus of the main political factions. and that is true for the first half of the plo existence until 1988 and it hasn't been true since because you have these major political organizations like hamas and a few secular groups outside of the umbrella of the plo. palestinians are now paying the price for allowing these groups
to operate outside of the agreed-upon consensual national umbrella. on the one hand, the plo claims to be the legitimate representative but on the other hand, it does not include these major factions that have attacked. some of them have won elections so they clearly belong in the big tent of the palestinian politics, but they are not represented. elections are not a substiitute for a national agreement. it is messy and may seem
michael, stepping outside domestic politics, i wonder if you could address the relationship between israel and egypt and the way it has been managed over the cease-fires. there was an interesting piece in "the wall street journal" that talked about the closeness that has developed such as the united states is almost being cut out of the discussions. what is your perspective of egypt's role and will it impact politics in israel at all? >> i think you have to say it is constructive if for no other reason than egypt was the one party that brought the sides together to brokered the cease-fire. so in that sense it was certainly constructive. the first couple weeks, the fact egypt had no creditability with hamas and that egypt didn't want to do much to do with hamas at
all was a factor in extending the fighting. in contrast to 2012, where hamas trusted egypt as a broker and this time they did not. i don't know how constructive they were able to play in the beginning. as the fighting went on, egypt was able to broker a deal, and that is certainly constructive. in term of how it factors into the israeli politics, netanyahu has been a phrase being used talking about new diplomatic horizons, and a lot of people assumed that meant with the palestinians. i don't think it does. i think he is talking about a wider regional initiative where israeli is aligned with states like egypt, jordan, saudi arabia in an effort to limit the influence of hamas and other
muslim brotherhood groups. he is looking to use the fight and the region where you have a split among arab states and if you widen it you can include turkey. i think he is looking to take advantage of that situation and get israel firmly into the camp of what we might call status quo arab state versus revision arab states. so to the extent that a closer bond with egypt helps israel get into the that group than i think israel is going to try to play that angle as hard as it can. i am not sure how feasible it is. i think netanyahu thinks he has a stronger than he actually does.
but between that and the fact that israel has lots of natural gas to sell and signed an mou this week with jordan that was worth $15 billion, i believe. and they are looking to do something similar with egypt. between energy and regional dynamic and betwene a joint desire between egypt and israel to limit hamas' influence, i think netanyahu and his government will try to get as close to egypt as they can. >> thank you. i think we have about 20, 25 minutes left. going to the audience for questions now. please identify yourself, your affiliation, and keep the question short and ask the question in the form of a question, please. >> i am jim. i don't know if any of you read the op-ed piece by former ambassador kirkser.
he was the former u.s. ambassador to israel during the first bush ii administration. his proposal was twofold. one was to bring in an international force with boots on the ground in gaza that would provide security and maybe even governance of gaza with the palestinian authority playing a role, but a light role given their dysfunction. and basically they serve as a referee between the plo and hamas. and both boots on the ground was saying he expected them to be arab boots on the ground and maybe turkish but certainly not american. secondly, most interestingly he linked that to an international peace conference where the same
countries would then be negotiating with israel and palestinian authority on a more sure palestinian authority on a more long-term permanent solution. he thought israel would be much more prone to do that today given what happened in gaza and the need for international force in gaza, which he thinks israel would accept. again, this is all him saying that. my question to both of you, from a palestinian and an israeli point of view, how do you think this will fly in those respective societies? >> i will start. i don't know how well the idea of international force would fly within israeli society. certainly not a force that includes turkey at this time. i think in general the thrust of public opinion within israel now is that the best solution would be for the palestinian authority
forces to takeover security and border crossings in gaza. and whatever beast the israeli government has over the palestinian authority, they have very few with p.a. security in the west bank. so i think there is some sort of level of implicit trust that exists among the israeli government and large portions of israeli society for the p.a. security forces that would not necessarily translate into a wider force comprised of soldiers from other arab countries and from turkey. in general, i think the israelis are wary of internationizing the conflict too much. certainly, israel's experience with the international community least. and the level of trust is very low. i don't imagine there would be a huge amount of positive for the international force as opposed
to a p.a. force. >> i think you can make the argument on the palestinian as well. there is not a lot of incentive to have an international force. i think there would be a lot of disagreement among the regional stake stakeholders and the united states and others. hamas has said they will not accept an international presence. the p.a. has no intent to accept the international role of governing. that was the purpose of the palestinian authority. and in a way it is kind of a setback for the idea of a palestinian state. i think the problem with palestinian governance is not they don't know how to govern.
it is there is this lack of basic national concensus, that that is what is missing and the conversation isn't being had in the same way the egyptian and syrian conversation isn't being had. there are different degrees of consequences. that basic consent needs to be achieved by various palestinian groups. that is the impediment. i don't think it is a technical know how. both p.a. and hamas can govern. and both have shown they are able to maintain security. the question about israel's security relates to political goals and objectives. there is an outstanding conflict between palestinians and between palestinians and israel.
there is a blockade, an occupation, and there are issues. that is the source of insecurity and violence, not primarily because of a lack of capacity i would argue. there is a lack of will to maintain israel's security because one side has an incentive to harm israel's security because of these ongoing issues. so unless the political issues can be resolved, i cannot imagine -- it isn't a situation of technical capacity. >> joe, you want to address? >> i didn't see the editorial but the way you present it it doesn't sound realistic it me. there is one where area where more shoes on the ground, boots on the ground, that in terms of the crossings between israel,
egypt, and gaza -- there is a security role in terms of -- and this would address or could address the blockaid issue -- if you had an inter international team of experts who could be monitoring for the transit of arms or equipment of military use and planning for follow-up monitoring of dual use items and would basically allow everything else in. and obviously that force, whatever its particular complexion, would need the confidence of israeli and whoever you are dealing with on the palestinian side. that was attempted in the past where the european union was supposed to provide those elements, and it ended up being a lack of israeli cooperation in allowing them to move to the border area and carry out their assigned roles. that would be worth exploring.
>> and the u.k., france, and germany all indicated -- they extended the mandate of the mission and they indicated they would be willing to support the p.a. coming back in. so i think that is a possibility. can we go to the gentlemen in the front here. >> i am from washington, d.c., and i thank the institute and the panels for this afternoon. i have two questions. the question is you mentioned importantly participation of the international of the palestinians to be consulted. how do you see that being carried out in practice? and my second question is, is
there any way to bring netanyahu and his bunch and hamas accountable for what they have done? >> on the first question, there have been a lot of proposals put out there emanating from inside the palestinian territory on how to reintegrate them into conversation at least, if not institutionally. bear in mind, the plo began as a diaspora movement and there is where it was forged. most of the current leadership in the plo are themselves refugees and not from the west bank. some people have proposed elections.
election can be held in lebanon and syria for refugees. the mechanisms are there. it is a question of political will. the same way plo was convened, created without a territory or a base, it can be reinvented in a sense where the mechanisms are out there and what isn't there is the political will by the current leadership, whether it is hamas or fatah other factions to reintegrate the diaspora institutionally, not on an individual bases. that would take rethinking the plo as an institution, and that conversation is happening among a lot of palestinian
intellectuals, but hasn't yet produced an outcome. >> on the accountability question, it is a good question and i tried to suggest in my talk that, you know, perhaps the dimension of these national criminal court has a greater viability today. i would not say it is great, but it is more than it had been. i think there are steps along these lines that individual states can take, particularly states that are close allies of one party or the other. certainly in the case of israel's close allies, starting with the united states, for instance there is a u.s. law on the books referred to as
the leahy law, that says units of a security force cannot receive u.s. assistance or arms or funding if they have been credibly shown to have been involved in war crimes and human rights violations in war. as i understand it and i have been told -- and those assessments are supposed to be made in the u.s. embassy and there is no body in israel in the u.s. consolate that has been followed up with. that would be interesting to , to pursue this.
if it is true, you know, to remedy that. so there would be that kind of, you know, mandated reporting that might have consequences and i am not looking here in terms of, you know, so much cutting off arms supplies as much as giving incentives, in this case, to the israelis, to carry out more serious investigations and hold their own officers accountable. >> i do apologize in advance if i cannot get to you. i just want to hit around the room a bit. i will come back to you. let me go to the lady on the aisle. >> i am a physician and a member of j street. my question is for mr. coplow. you have not talk about the united states -- when you discussed domestic politics, you didn't mention the united
states. but the right wing and ultra right wing in israel -- do they not care what the united states this happening -- thinks or assume the united states will back them no matter what? >> i am not sure it is an issue of not caring what the united states thinks. sure, there are some that view antagonistic agains4t israel, as absurd as that is. i don't think this is an sure of not caring what the u.s. thinks. i think it is more of an issue of trying to figure out at what level the u.s. cares. to the extent the u.s. cares
about very deeply, you will see the israelis hold off. i will give you an example. before the 2013 election, the israeli government announced tender plans to build an e-1 which is the area in the east bank with a lot of contention and the buidling would cut the northern and southern west bank in half. that was a plan that was never going to be implemented because that is one of the u.s.' clear red lines, and it has been for a while. it wasn't implemented and i don't expect it to be. so on things like that the israeli government certainly cares what the united states thinks. on other issues, if they think they can get away with it without consequences, they'll do it. that does not make them unique. the relationship between israeli and the united states is a lot more complex and complicated than the united states' relationship with other countries.
so there is a lot more back and forth, and this red line gets tested far more often. but i would not say in general netanyahu and more mainstream politicians don't care but it is more a matter of testing the boundaries. >> this gentlemen here in the blue shirt. wait for the mic, please. >> i am herbert grossman and i am a retired judge. my main question is when you talk about two factions among the palestinians and one faction of the plo or fatah or the palestinian authority is in favor of two states and hamas is opposed to that you are only talking about the surface. the fact of the matter is, whether you agree with me or
not, most of the palestinians believe abbas is in favor of a temporary two-state and that eventually they will take over the other state. so it is a matter of stages. whether he actually believes that or not we could argue all day. but the fact is if the palestinians saw he really was in favor of a final situation of two states they would not vote for it. he would get the same percentage of votes that were low in the previous election. 3%. he is 79 years old now. polls indicate a two-state solution isn't what the bulk of the arabs in the arabs in israel want, in palestine.
so what benefit is there for israel to go into negotiation for a two-state solution if they will end up with the same thing they have from hamas and this goes from your position who doesn't tell us why the right ring has ascended, especially since the last war, the fact that most people realize if they give over strategic positions in the west bank they will end up with the same thing they have in the southern border with hamas and on the northern border with hezbollah -- rockets, tunnels and artillery aimed at the coastal heartland of palestinian. and the third thing is that everybody in this room recognizes that israel did everything it could to spare civilian casualties -- [laughter] >> please, all right.
ladies and gentlemen, please. did, noterything they bombs on the roofs of houses, the calling off of airstrikes -- everybody knows that. this stuff here doesn't belong in this kind of discussion here. but you are picking on little things which -- to talk about the international court which is loaded against israel is no solution at all. those are my comments on that. i do not want to prolong you. >> let's address that, as you will. >> i will take the first piece. i don't know if i agree with the characterization that most palestinians believe in two states in order to in two states in order to take over israel eventually.
the reality is more nuanced on that. on the israeli and palestinian sides, the two-state solution has been a precarious concept always. on the mindset of both sides they would go for one state in their ideal way. for palestinians it is one historical state of palestine and there are palestinians who are citizens of israel, who were refugees or from the west bank -- they are all palestinians. i think the dream is to have a single democratic state from the river to the sea. but there was a moment in which there was a broad political and even popular consensus to move away from that and say if we as palestinian are going to exercise self determination it will be in the context of a two-state solution. the two state solution for
palestinians has been the least worse option always. it is not the best option. and that is why you see the slim plurality that supports it. if you measure support for a two-state solution and poll 1990 and 1988 and poll it today, you will find different results i think, especially from the younger generation. the younger generation said you tried to get two states. it didn't work. we had the experiment and it never went anywhere because israel isn't prepared to let go of control. the question you ask is what incentive does israel have. the bottom line is palestinians are after self determination and they can only get it two ways and that is in the context of two states or in the context of one state. it is essentially a choice that israel has. there is not another way for
palestinians have to rights, to have citizenship rights equal with other people in the world outside of those two. we have a one-state reality, but it isn't one based on equality or rights, not based on self-determination. so if the two-state solution, which is a compromise, from the standpoint of the palestinians, if that is rejected, which sounds like you reject, then there will ultimately be no choice for palestinians to pursue, if they want to have rights, and of course they do, other than to seek them through a one-state, one-man, one-vote state, and it can be called israel, it can be called palestinian, it can be called anything they want. but they will seek their rights
one way or another. it is up for israel to decide which one it is prepared to accommodate. i think from how i understand israeli interests, a two-state solution would be more favorable to them than a one state which i think would be aninevitability if the two-state solution isn't possible. >> we just have a few minutes lef. michael and joe, want to address any of that? >> on the strength of the israeli right, i believe it was clear because it was due to a security concern. it has been that way since the the second intifada, and i think that is the way it is going to remain. israelis have security concerns and i think they are rightly held and it is certainly making sense they are going to be
attracted to parties that address those concerns to the extent that israeli voters want them addressed. and that is not to say that there is not a big chunk of israelis who are still in favor of a two-state solution. let's not forget the 2009 elections, the party that won the elections won 39 to 49, but the reason livni didn't become the prime minister was because she could not put a coalition together. but the vote leader in 2009 was a party that was running on a platform of tuesday solutions. certainly, security is paramount for many israeli voters and does explain the right of the israeli right ring. >> joe, final thoughts? >> hard to know what to say. obviously, we disagree about israel doing everything possible
to spare civilians, and i am not sure about picayune situations you said i raised to the contrary. one of the purposes it can serve is leverage for the state of israel or any other state where one of the purposes it can serve, leverage israel. should be doing in the first place. >> i want to thank our panelists and thank you for being with us today. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]
>> here are some highlights for this coming weekend. today at 6:30 p.m. on the communicators, former s.e.c. -- f.c.c. commissioners. watch the latest debates on c-span. sunday at noon, debates between ay hagen and thom tillice. and california, jerry brown and publican nominee, neil kashkari. sunday at noon on "in depth" our three-hour conversation with mary frances berry. today on real america on c-span 3, the building of the hoover dam and sunday night at 8:00 the anniversary of president ford's pardon of richard nixon. let us know what you think about he programs you're watching.
send us a tweet at hashtag c 123. you can like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. with congress return monday, here is a message from one of the student cam competition winners. >> foods that are most often genetically modified a tomatoes, corn and soybeans. >> according to the usda, 90% of all corn and cotton and 93% of all soybean crops planted in united states are genetically modified. >> they are genetically modifying rice to treat vitamin a deficiencies throughout the world. >> there are people starving in africa. if we can get them the food they need, i say why not? >> both the safety and
nutritional values of g.m.a.'s is highly disputed. >> there is no difference. it is not going improve your life or health or nothing ditchts as long as you eat fresh. >> who is responsible for determining whether or not g.m. foods should be labeled, banned or simply ignored? you decide. >> join us next wednesday during "washington journal" for c-span's 2015 student cam competition. the washington supreme court heard arguments. several landowners challenged the governor's decision. in february, the court ruled the governor did not have the authority to approve the new route. this is just over 30 minutes. >> all rise.
i am here today. i would like to reserve three minutes of my time for rebuttal. we are asking this court to reverse the decision for two reasons. first, -- lb 1161 does not the exclusive jurisdiction. we stand on those arguments. we will turn now to the merits of our case. >> well, just a minute. on your standing, didn't we in cunningham versus x carve out an exception to the standing rule? would you agree that this concerns a matter of great concern? >> yes. >> and that was a standing.
and that case did not have a legal extend it through involved, correct? >> that is correct. >> why did exxon control that? >> in cunningham versus exxon, there was no one to actually challenge the constitutionality of the statute. it is not only that it has to be a matter of important public purpose, but there must be no individual or entity that can challenge the constitutionality of the statute. >> did we say that in cunningham? i believe we did, your honor. >> if there's illegal expenditure, does that go to both? >> illegal expenditure goes to the taxpayer standing analysis. we would argue that in this case, we would argue that the statute on its face requires reimbursement for every expenditure associated with the statute implementation, and that there is no unlawful expenditure of taxpayer funds. >> if we were to decide that
there was an illegal expenditure, what does that do to your argument? >> if there was an unlawful expenditure of taxpayer funds, we would still submit that this is a case where there are individuals better suited to bring this challenge. the taxpayer standing exception is limited to allow these particular appellees to go forward with limited exception. >> who is better suited to bring this lawsuit? >> for one, the pipeline carriers, who are actually subject to the regulations under lb 1161. >> why would a pipeline challenge this legislation? the pipeline company would challenge this legislation because prior to its adoption, there was simply no restriction on their ability to engage in
imminent domain. as long as they were entitled to, they were entitled to proceed with the pipeline. >> isn't it more beneficial now that they have two options? to have their application granted. >> i suppose it is more beneficial, that they have two options, but there are still argument to be made that if they wanted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute they can do so. >> when you said "every expenditure," could you explain that, please? you said that every expenditure would be reimbursed? does that encompass new money, old money, direct or indirect? what you mean by that? >> within the record there is an affidavit, and every cost associated with the limitation of the development oflb 1161 in
all of the cases that it was applied was reimbursed, not just over and above, but any imaginable task. -- cost. >> does the record reflect that expenditures were made above and beyond the appropriation made by the legislature? even though they may have been reimbursed. doesn't the record show that? >> the record shows there was an authorization of an appropriation of $2 million, and as i understand, the record reflects an additional total amount was paid, but that the applicant paid the money as they went and never exceeded that $2 million limit. >> $2 million outstanding? is that your view?
>> that is what the appropriation was by the legislature. >> and you are saying that the pattern of this reimbursement was such that it was never more than $2 million outstanding? >> that is manner standing, yes. >> in the decision of chambers, doesn't that confer upon taxpayers the illegal use of public money to pass the laws? >> yes, but again, in this case we were talking about a statute where it requires reimbursement on state and there is no illegal expenditure. >> if that is the case, then it would allow for an evasion of a standing for a taxpayer. >> well, on this, what we are talking about is a facial challenge to the taxpayer, you are right. if there was a reimbursement provision, it would potentially foreclose a facial challenge to
a taxpayer. >> what about the other case? does that have anything to do with standing? >> yes, it does. as this court held in riddum as to the commission's authority, it is to the claim of unlawful investment. >> this case is an outlier, isn't it? there are only three judges that decided the case, and for judges concurred without an opinion. -- four judges concurred without an opinion. is that a useful source for authority? >> but as to the pfc ability to challenge it, this court has never questioned whether or not -- or has never overturned the conclusion. >> has that been cited since? >> it has been cited since in the number of taxpayer standing, but i'm not sure -- >> it was a statutory
construction interpretation, wasn't it? >> that is correct. turning now to the merits, article four, section 20, set for the powers and duties of the pfc to include the regulation of rates, service, and general control of common carriers as the legislature may provide by law. in the absence of specific legislation, the pfc has plenary authority. the constitution of the united states allows the legislature to limit the pfc authority, and for pipeline companies, they have done so. nebraska statute 75.501 defined pipeline common carriers as those which operate intrastate in nebraska. the plaintiff is not challenging this statutory limit on the pfc authority. the pfc has no constitutional jurisdiction over noncommon carriers. >> that statute was passed in, what, 1963?
>> that is correct. >> and it had its origin in the statute in 1917, did it not? >> as i recall, that is correct. >> and you think that may have been passed to answer the concerns of the e lse ohio oil, -- the ohio oil, which was the standard case? >> as i recall, the iteration of 75.501 was still operating in nebraska and through nebraska. it never contemplated that carriers would go beyond that. >> maybe they were contemplating to ensure after that decision that nebraska would regulate intrastate common carriers, not to define common carriers. >> the intent was to regulate common carriers, which operate intrastate. and by operation, they define what a common carrier was, which was those that operate
intrastate in nebraska. >> in fact, our interstate pipelines largely regulated by the federal government? >> they are, your honor. in addition, lb 1161 only applies to those pipelines which are subject to a federal me the -- mepa review process. and they specifically excludes gather lanes, which are the typical intrastate pipelines within the state of nebraska. >> is this all about site location? >> it is all about site location and whether or not that falls within the plenary authority of the pfc. we would submit that article four, section 20 applies to rates, service, and general control of the intrastate
services. >> how are you using the legendary of authority? -- plenary authority? >> as it applies to the intrastate common carriers. >> the source is what? >> the constitution. >> and you do not distinguish from relying on the definition in chapter 75. >> correct. and intrastate pipelines would not be subject to the common carrier definition. pfc only has the authority that the legislature would otherwise provide to them. >> you are implying that the federal government has totally occupied the field of regulation in the intrastate pipeline. >> no, that is not an issue that has been raised by the appellees in this case. >> why would citing not come under general control? >> when you look at the cases that involve siting, for example, with rivets having a
pfc authority, it is because of the customers along that route. they wanted service to be a part of this, to send their goods down a particular railroad. here, the appellees are not concerned with wanting service or any sort of thing along that line. they want to make sure that this pipeline does not run down this particular route. and therefore, it falls outside of the rates, service, and general control that would generally apply to the pfc. >> in your use of the word service, are we to understand that you mean delivery intrastate. >> that is correct, your honor. >> there are a lot of people that look for service. if it goes through your property, does this, does that. >> yes, of course, the pipeline affects all kinds of people. that is why the state of
nebraska has determined that for good public purpose that the pipeline be constructed within the state of nebraska and go through these routes so that the goods they are providing are provided. >> can i connect that a little bit to the whole picture? what do you think the trial judge did wrong? >> i believe the trial court was concerned because the particular pipeline company had eminent domain authority, and she saw the eminent domain authority is being equated with common carriers. and while common carriers have eminent domain authority, the legislature has afforded that authority to a broader group, and we would submit that it is not just common carriers. it is intrastate pipelines, which are not common carriers under the plane definition
language under 75.501, also have that eminent domain. >> would and intrastate carrier be a common carrier under the common law definition of that term? >> the common law definition, as pointed to by district court, is actually a prior redirection of -- iteration of the statute, which again, if you read it closely, it says "operating in between locations within nebraska." again, the common law there even contemplates intrastate. with that, i will save my time for rebuttal. >> thank you very much. mr. domina, good morning. >> good morning, your honor. may it please the court, i am dave domina, and i'm here on behalf of the three landowners that challenge lb 1161 and contend that it violates several provisions of the nebraska constitution. one of those was discussed earlier today, article four, section 20. in addition to that, additional ways for a pipeline applicant to
seek permission to build a pipeline in the brusca provides for a route that is without judicial review. if it goes to the governor and the governor makes the decision of the kind that would otherwise be made with legal limits apply, with proof required, and with due process hearing, if the governor makes that decision and set of the pfc, there is no judicial review in this statute. for that simple and specific reason, i'm answered by the attorney general see the court's decision today as simple and straightforward. >> excuse me. standing? >> yes, we do believe our clients have standing. for three separate reasons. the one that has not been discussed thus far is direct standing. i want to recall some dates. lb 1161 was enacted by the legislature on april 17.
we filed this lawsuit on may 23 or 25. i don't recall which date right now. the record contains an exhibit 18, which is a voluminous exhibit. it includes within exhibit 18 that appendix b, a root, and that route in that appendix came into existence in september after we filed our lawsuit. the affidavit evidence we offered on the standing issue establishes that our clients are landowners and taxpayers and as -- that their land is or was on the route. the affidavits were made after exhibit 18 came into existence. >> with respect to think of -- to plaintiff thompson, the allegation is merit in lancaster county. is that right? >> right. >> and at the time they
commenced a lawsuit -- those were after. >> the route was fluid. as a matter of fact, at the time that we filed this facial challenge, there was no route. there have been discussions, but no filing with the public service commission or with the governor. there was no permit because the statute authorizing it had not been enacted. >> so as the route morphed. they are still plaintiff's in your view. >> we think they are still direct plaintiffs. >> we are talking about the final reroute. >> exhibit 18 is the final reroute, your honor. >> do we have any addresses or legal descriptions of the property your clients own? >> we do not. we also do not have any addresses are legal descriptions of the route.
if you look at exhibit 18, what it does is identify in a very rough, non-meets and bounds way where this pipeline would purport to go, plus or minus a mile on either side in a map drawn in exhibit 18. there are no legal descriptions in the record. we think that the standing issue, the direct standing issue, makes us appropriate point is. -- appropriate plaintiffs. the taxpayer standing issue does as well. and of course, cunningham versus exxon, this is obviously a case of substantial public interest and has commanded the subsequent attention of a general session, a letter from the governor to the president of the united states, and action that is in record by the u.s. state department. we think that standing is not a matter that is of concern here
today. >> on the issue of direct standing, didn't the district court concluded that your client did not have direct standing. >> it did, your honor, and did so because it specifically said that our landowner plaintiffs own real estate which is or was on the pipeline route. that is why i was careful to pull out the dates and identify those this morning for the court. >> did you cross-appeal on that determination? what is no, we did not. we did not because we took the position strictly that we have standing, since standing is jurisdictional. we think we only need one kind of standing. we did not need to cross-appeal the direct standing findings of the court. >> in regard to taxpayer standing, we have spoken about whether or not there is a better plaintiff. who has the burden to show that? >> your honor, the party that challenges standing must show
that a better plaintiff that exists. >> what is your authority for that? >> you made findings that strongly suggests that as recently as your knox county taxpayers decision, banks versus heineman, i think your project extra mile clearly discloses that it was not the nonprofit challenge for the liquor statute that had to identify an alternate plaintiff. and the rationale was that you would put a taxpayer who seeks to sue in the position of proving a negative. if the proposition were to prove there is no one better to sue than us. instead, the proposition to be proven is someone identified better to sue than you. >> the state argues that the carriers would be the proper party. >> yes, i heard that this morning. there are, of course, none identified. the state has never suggested there is another applicant for
an international border crossing permit that seeks to put a pipeline through nebraska, which is this specific class of statute. when it says "other carriers" it is motioning to the universe without identifying another potential plaintiff. >> can the pfc challenge the statue? >> i don't think the public service commission is in a place of standing here. it has a route, and it is in place. its route is in a place that is not a part of this litigation. if we were to conclude that the pfc is duty bound to challenge any statute that might affect his jurisdiction, we set up interagency disputes within the state government that i don't think are consistent with your finding with your previous holdings. i do think the previous cases have suggested that they are
outlines. it is much clearer that your jurisprudence has moved in the direction of making sure that when there is an expenditure issue that is challenge, a taxpayer can make that challenge, unless it is altogether clear that the taxpayer is meddling in a problem that involves someone who is a dramatically more directly affected player. >> a better one. >> yes. >> would than to have rule written? >> no, you don't. it is a morality opinion. it is confined to narrow facts, and for good reasons. your jurisprudence has decided that in the past. you could overrule it, but i don't think it would be here properly. >> i think the state has relied that is the definition of a common carrier. >> yes, and if i do not get to our cross-appeal issues, and i may not, i want to be sure that i say that we think we win on all of the cross-appeal photo. -- cross-appeal issues. >> which one is your strongest? >> i don't want to lose justice
connolly, your honor, but i think my best argument is that it is standardless when the gubernatorial route for approval is taken. in order to ensure there is a valid delegation of authority, assuming there can be a delegation, it is standardless in this statute. i don't think there should be a delegation. as a lawyer and part-time banker, i really like our credit of the state argument, too, but i will answer the justice's question about 75.501. it is a statute that has a history very closely related to u.s. supreme court jurisprudence.
, as you said a few moments ago. it does not purport to define the outer limits of the public service commissions constitutional authority. it does not purport to define the legislatures limitations on its subsequent and enactments that involve the public service commission. it does not purport to say that a common carrier, using a pipeline as the mode of transportation of cargo for the public, has to be intrastate in order to be effective. as we said in our brief on page 14, we identify five separate reasons why that argument fails. i think the best of those is that at any particular moment, or hour or week, a pipeline can be either an intrastate or interstate carrier. it can switch back and forth, just like a trucking company can do. >> in fact, the regulation of this pipeline is largely
federal, is it not? >> only in so far as safety is concerned, your honor. there are no federal siting regulations. >> does the public service commission have any authority to control the rate, for example, the way our gas would move through this pipeline? >> if it had intrastate commerce, it does. if it is interstate commerce, i don't begin to. >> so largely, this is about site location. >> i think it is entirely a site location case, your honor. and i think the aspect of major oil pipeline law leaves those issues to the states.